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Abstract: 
This paper explores the new role that non-OECD nations such as Brazil, India, 
Russia, South Africa, South Korea and, especially, China are playing in providing 
international development aid.  While global aid flows from traditional OECD 
nations remain significant to the development of global politics and what William 
Robinson calls the “Transnational State” (TNS) apparatus, these new aid donors 
are challenging the Western nations’ vision of what development means and what 
kind of global economy is being built.  The consequences of these increasing aid 
flows for the global economy and for the development of aid recipient nations at 
this point are unclear.  But it is crucial for scholars to pay close attention to the 
rise in official development assistance (ODA) from non-OECD nations as a key 
indicator of global political and economic integration. Bringing together insights 
from world systems theory, world polity theory, field theory, Robinson’s 
Transnational State perspective, and Saskia Sassen’s work on deterritoriality and 
denationization, this paper considers the role that new donors are likely to play 
within the global political economy in the coming decades.   Particular attention 
is paid to whether the so-called “South-South” aid from these new donors is really 
“South-South,” whether we can expect to see a counterhegemonic shift in aid 
practice, what kind of future conflicts between donors are on the horizon, what 
this might mean for world state formation, and finally, whether any of this 
amounts to the beginning of the end for the nearly 60-year old Western aid 
apparatus. 
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Introduction 
 
What is the role of official development assistance within the processes of 
globalization?   Much of the existing literature on international development 
organizations and the global aid flows they administer tends to suggest that aid 
plays a secondary role in the capitalist world economy.  Leslie Sklair, for example, 
states that aid’s importance is “distinctly marginal” within global capitalism 
(2005:69).   Scholars writing from the world systems tradition tend to place more 
emphasis on other kinds of global economic flows such as trade and foreign 
direct investment (FDI).   Work being done within the world polity perspective 
tends to focus on how global norms and world “cultural scripts” operating within 
international organizations are more important than the aid itself.   Aid is part of 
world polity formation but not the foremost concern.   
 
Sociologists of globalization who pay more careful attention to the role of aid 
within the capitalist world economy emphasize that development assistance is 
part of “global governance.”  Phillip McMichael, for instance, states that aid 
organizations are implementing a “globalization project” on behalf of wealthy 
countries and focuses primarily on Bretton Woods institutions (1996).  Yet he 
also places more importance on FDI when compared to aid itself and there is 
some confusion regarding what he means by a “project.”  Such a term conveys a 
somewhat uniform approach and does not signify the dynamic, complex and 
sometimes contradictory nature of the international development system as a 
whole.  William I. Robinson’s work is perhaps most adept at discussing the role of 
aid institutions within the global economy by arguing that they are part of an 
“emerging Transnational State apparatus (TNS) (2001, 2004).  But his critics 
have pointed out some concern over his use of the term “state” and whether it is 
accurate to suggest that such an entity is coming into existence (Block 2001, 
Goldfrank 2001, McMichael 2001). 
 
We can draw several overall lessons from the sociological scholarship on aid:  
First, aid itself and the political consequences of the aid apparatus itself are 
somewhat taken-for-granted sociological phenomena within development 
sociology and are under-examined theoretically.  This is perhaps surprising to 
observe within a field whose main purpose is to study all facets of “development” 
in the world. This could be due to the fact that the institutions that exist to 
promote it are so ubiquitous that they fall within the realm of the “taken for 
granted” and are not particularly interesting to us as development sociologists.  
Second, aid is generally seen as either economic (in which case it plays a minor 
role) or political (in which case it plays an emerging role) but not both.  And 
third, much scholarly emphasis within the social sciences has tended to 
emphasize the “end of development”, the “crisis of development” and so on (see, 
e.g. Esteva 1992, Sachs 1992).  Some of these scholars go so far as to predict its 
demise at precisely the time when it may be truly coming of age.  
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One of the topics that development sociologists and globalization scholars up 
until now have largely failed to address is the role of emerging donors and how 
they fit into these debates.  Emerging donors challenge the very conventions and 
terminology used by scholars within these fields to define the world around them.  
What do core and periphery mean anymore if peripheral countries are giving aid?  
What are “developed countries” and “less developed countries” in this context?  
What will become of the Bretton Woods system?  The “Washington consensus”?  
What happens to the inter-state system of world-systems theory, Robinson’s 
Transnational State or John Meyer’s (et al.) “world polity” (1997) if new donors 
emerge to disrupt these hegemonic structures?  And finally, were predictions and 
inquiries into a “post-development era” premature?  The goal of this paper is to 
address these theoretical questions by briefly examining some of the new aid 
donors and their recent activities, by looking at how commentators in the “global 
north” have responded to these new activities, and, finally, by exploring what 
these emerging donors, particularly China,  are likely to mean for development 
sociologists and globalization scholars. 
 
Theorizing Aid  
 
This paper examines the role that aid plays in the global economy by following in 
the scholarly tradition laid out by  Pierre Bourdieu, Arturo Escobar, James 
Ferguson and William I. Robinson but also taking it in a new direction.  
Bourdieu’s definition of globalization as an “economic politics seeking to unify 
the economic field by means of a whole group of legal-political measures… put to 
work by an ensemble of agents and institutions” (2001:2) is useful if we apply it 
to the case of international development assistance.  In addition, this analysis 
builds on Robinson’s “transnational state” approach (2001, 2004).  However, 
Robinson may overstate the role played by the transnational capitalist class 
(TCC) in the world of development.  Aid is largely guided by the interests of 
capital, as the Robinson model maintains, but it carries out other agendas as well 
(including pro-labor, anti-corporate pollution, women’s and indigenous rights) 
and these agendas can even be at loggerheads with the neo-liberal agendas 
promoted by the TCC (Jackson 2005: 9).  Furthermore, his emphasis on the 
concept of global “state” formation may be misplaced.   Aid is about global 
governance, politics and power, and it seems clear that aid agencies intervene in 
local politics, engage in surveillance of local political dynamics, set political 
agendas and “projects” and even try to “garner local political consent” for their 
agendas, (Jackson 2005) but these agencies do not particularly resemble a “state” 
or even an “emerging state apparatus.”  Rather, it might be preferable to think of 
aid agencies as a “transnational institution” made up of complex large-scale 
transnational organizations.  The distinction here is a Parsonian one where 
“institution” refers to phenomena occurring at a cultural level (as world polity 
theorists emphasize) and are a “given part of the social structure” (Parsons 1956).  
Aid, in this sense, is a global institution, one that follows well established rules 
and traditions and one in which various human groups can chose to participate 
or not.  An “organization” on the other hand, is a modern bureaucratic form of 
human action, according to Parsons.  It is a “system which, as the attainment of 
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its goal, ‘produces’ an indentifiable something which can be utilized in some way 
by another system” (65).    
 
By defining aid in this way, we avoid the problem of seeing it as primarily a 
feature of the economy or primarily a feature of the polity.  Aid occupies the 
interstitial space between the “market” and the “state.”  Using this formulation, 
we can draw upon the strengths of various approaches:  World systems theory is 
most useful in placing emphasis on the role of capital in the formation of global 
structures and institutions, particularly the global economy.  Robinson’s TNS 
model is a prime example of this as he explicitly chooses to emphasize a Marxian 
definition of the state over a Weberian one in concluding that state institutions 
are creations of capital.  World polity theory is useful in its emphasis on 
bureaucratic institutions and their role in creating global cultural forms that have 
a significant role, particularly in the formation of world political structures (see 
e.g.  Boli and Thomas, 1997; Swiss, 2012).  But the world-systems/world-polity 
perspectives can be seen as mutually compatible (instead of being in conflict) if 
we think of aid as “economic politics” -- as simultaneously political and 
economic.  In many ways, aid is a clear example of how the world economy might 
best be thought of as a system of “bureaucratic capitalism” (Sjoberg 1999) in 
which capitalism itself is embedded in modern bureaucratic institutions 
operating within what Fligstein and McAdam call "strategic action fields." (2012: 
9)  
 
Sociologists have long understood the importance of institutions, but theories of 
globalization (with a few exceptions, i.e. Evans 1995) have tended to be based 
within macro perspectives that place lesser emphasis on the role that institutions 
play within "constructed mesolevel social orders" and how people within these 
institutions engage in collective action (Fligstein and McAdam 2012: 9)  By 
incorporating field theory into the discussion that world systems and world polity 
scholars are having, we can gain a greater understanding of the role that aid 
agencies play within the global political economy as they occupy the mesolevel 
interstitial space between market and politics; between global and local.   
 
Development aid has been in many ways a "settled field," one which "exhibits 
very high consensus and that... despite widespread dissent and open conflict, 
nonetheless exhibit a stable structure over time" (Fligstein and McAdam: 12).  
The institution of aid, as well as the organizations which administer official 
development assistance, are the historical creations of donor countries.  While 
the global practice of providing economic assistance among nations has roots in 
both the distant (e.g. Mauss’ “The Gift”) and more recent past (e.g. colonialism), 
modern aid giving is an institution firmly based upon the post-WWII founding of 
the Bretton Woods organizations such as the World Bank and IMF (in 1944), the 
United Nations (1945)  and, most significantly perhaps, the Organization of 
Economic Cooperation and Development (1960) and its predecessor:  the 
Organization of European Economic Cooperation (1948).  Originally created to 
administer U.S. and Canadian post-war reconstruction funds in Europe under the 
Marshall plan, the OECD and Bretton Woods agencies, in particular, developed 
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the policies, frameworks and norms that would set the stage for international 
development assistance for decades to come.  Finding success in rebuilding war-
torn European economies and societies, these agencies explicitly and very self-
consciously set about to apply the same practices to economies and societies in 
the “developing world.”  The original twenty nations that provided the monetary 
wherewithal for these efforts were the leading industrialized nations and 
wealthiest economies in the world at that time.   Now made up of thirty-four 
member nations, the OECD is the global institution that defines “donor nation” at 
the global level and sets the rules whereby donor nations report and administer 
the aid provided to “recipient nations” throughout the world. 
 
Since the birth of the OECD, many other organizations have emerged throughout 
the world that participate in the transnational institution of aid, including 
“official” bilateral and multilateral organizations, as well as “unofficial” or private 
voluntary organizations and non-governmental organizations.  Taken all together 
these aid organizations are “agents of globalization" acting on behalf of donor 
countries” (Jackson, 2005: 126)   The primary agendas of aid organizations are 
economic integration into the world economy and neo-liberalism, but these are 
not the only agendas.  As world polity theorists maintain, other “global cultural 
scripts” are promoted as well.  Within the institution of aid we see a “multiplicity 
of agendas” arranged in a hierarchy of importance depending on the donor 
countries’ shifting priorities and concerns.  These agendas can even be in conflict 
with one another without challenging the stable structure of the field itself 
(Jackson 2005). 
 
The institution of aid is transnational, which means it is neither “global” nor 
“national” nor “local.”  Rather, it creates “denationalized” spaces and “specialized 
assemblages as a new type of territoriality” (Sassen 2006, 2008).  As Sassen 
states:  “These institutions should rather be conceived of as powerful capabilities 
for the making of a new order—they are instruments, not the new order itself”  
(2008: 63).   Following Sassen and others, we can see that aid organizations in 
many ways are among the chief “architects” of the world political economy today.  
They are “globalizers,” ensuring that all nations and regions in the world become 
incorporated into both the global economy and world political norms.  As such, 
the institution of aid sits as the nexus between the global and the local, as well as 
the nexus between the polity and the economy.   
 
Within this nexus several important general observations can be made:  global 
agendas (donor agendas) tend to win out over local agendas most of the time;  
local agendas succeed inasmuch as they connect to global agendas (Jackson 
2005, see also e.g. Bob 2002; Swidler and Watkins 2009); local institutions in 
aid-recipient countries receive some benefits from participating in global 
agendas; the negative consequences of this interaction are downplayed by aid 
organizations and generally hidden by a “shiny veneer of beneficence” (Jackson 
2005: 12)  – the (often faulty) assumption that aid is by its very nature a practice 
of “helping,” “restoration,” and “progress.”  Finally, the greater benefits of the aid 
institution accrue to the donor countries that reap economic and political 
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rewards in return for their assistance packages.  These rewards have also 
remained largely hidden from view, though one may argue that they are 
becoming more apparent as new aid donors enter the fray (Jackson 2005). 
 
Aid agencies and the workers they employ are builders of the globalizing world 
political economy in large part due to the power they wield in the context of many 
recipient countries.  Though the extent of this power and influence varies from 
country to country (much greater in Honduras and Eritrea, much less in Peru and 
Thailand where current ODA flows are much smaller), and varies historically (aid 
to Costa Rica was high in the 1980s but has waned to almost nothing currently, 
while the heaviest aid flows to Afghanistan are a more recent phenomenon), the 
power of aid agencies in many contexts is important to understand.   
 
In a case study of the aid profession in Honduras, the mechanisms of authority 
and power that development agencies wield in aid-recipient societies were 
identified (Jackson 2005).  First, drawing on Anthony Giddens’ definition of 
power, aid agencies have “the capacity to intervene in a given set of events” and 
some of their power is predicated upon acting—upon inserting oneself (or one’s 
institution) into the social or political arena.  Second, power is built upon 
surveillance.  Using Escobar (1988, 1995) and Foucault (1979), it is easy to see 
how aid agencies conduct monitoring, research, and evaluation of every aspect of 
aid-recipient society in order to gather information and identify the “problems” 
or targets of intervention.  The ability of development organizations to subject 
developing nations to their “governor’s gaze” reveals the nature of their powerful 
position in these societies.  Third, these organizations create a multiplicity of 
blueprints and plans of action and, in so doing, engage in agenda setting.  This 
mechanism recognizes the observations made by Weber, Russell and Parsons 
who emphasized the extent to which power is based on intentional action, and 
the capacity to carry out “intended effects” or “goals.”  All large development 
agencies, in all recipient-nation contexts, possess formalized plans, objectives, 
strategies, programs and missions outlining very concrete and specific courses of 
action.  In so doing, they situate their activities as “governing” and position 
themselves as being involved in “running the country.”  Finally, putting a plan of 
action into effect requires garnering consent from local institutions by getting 
local participation and buy-in.  Building on Burawoy (1979) and Outhwaite and 
Bottomore’s interpretation of Arendt (1994), it is crucial to see how development 
agencies rely on the consent of local institutions and local professionals to put 
their plans into action.  Sometimes these local agencies have their own concerns 
and agendas that conflict with those of the globalizers.  In these situations, 
external agencies must promote their plans and encourage their acceptance 
through various means such as providing financial assistance, engaging in public 
relations campaigns, lobbying, or by conducting trainings, workshops, and 
coordination meetings.  International aid agencies spend a lot of time and money 
on “creating influence” and getting the “locals on board” (Jackson 2005; Watkins, 
Swidler, and Hannan 2012).   
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Who Are the “New Donors”? 
 
For a long time, the OECD was a select group, governed almost exclusively by 
those original twenty member nations who founded the organization in 1960.1  
Those member nations with the greatest influence and financial commitments 
created the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), a directorate within the 
OECD which reports and monitors “official development assistance” (ODA) 
worldwide, and sets the rules for its use.  In the 1970s and 80s, Japan, Finland, 
Australia and New Zealand became part of this donors club and, along with 
original members Greece, Luxembourg, Portugual and Spain, joined the DAC 
ruling body as well and became part of the transnational collective effort of 
managing “aid” worldwide, agreeing to help build “the capacity of developing 
countries to participate in the world economy.”   In short, they commit to help 
build the architecture of the world economy in the developing world.    
 
While some have only more recently become significant aid donors themselves, 
the member nations making up the OECD all take on significant economic and 
political responsibilities and, most would argue, all enjoy the significant 
economic and geo-political benefits as well (as will be discussed later in this 
paper).   Largely because of these benefits, other nations have sought to join the 
donors’ club through a very formalized OECD process known as “accession.”  
Donor nations that have joined the OECD in more recent years (after 1993) are 
typically considered “new donors” and include Mexico (1994), the Czech Republic 
(1995), Hungary (1996), Poland (1996), Korea (1996), the Slovak Republic 
(2000), Chile (2010), Slovenia (2010), Israel (2010), and Estonia (2010) (OECD 
2010a).   Most of these member nations are not, however, members of DAC2 or 
have only very recently3 become members.  These “new donors” do not all 
contribute significant amounts of aid to the developing world, but, as evident in 
Figure 3, their contributions are increasing and they are playing a greater role in 
the transnational institution of aid than was the case in the past. 
 
Furthermore, there are other “new donors” waiting in line to join the club.  
Russia began its efforts for accession to the OECD in 2006 (those efforts stalled 
with the crises in Crimea and the Ukraine).   The OECD launched accession 
discussions with Colombia and Latvia in 2013 and considered proposals to open 
accession discussions with Costa Rica and Lithuania in 2015.  These efforts to 
open up the “donors club” to a larger number of “developed” and “newly 
developed” countries caused the OECD Secretary-General to declare in 2010 that 
 
1 Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, 
United Kingdom, and United States. 
2 Mexico, Hungary, Chile, Israel, Estonia and founding member Turkey are not DAC 
members. 
3 Korea joined the DAC in 2010.  Iceland, Czech Republic, Poland, Slovak Republic, and 
Slovenia become members in 2013. 
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this once exclusive club is  “expanding its membership and its horizons” (OECD 
2010a) 
 
Such a declaration represents a growing awareness on the part of the OECD that 
many nations wish to experience the responsibilities and privileges associated 
with becoming members of the donors’ club, whether through joining the OECD 
or through becoming non-OECD aid donors themselves.  In 2007, the OECD 
devised a program called “enhanced engagement” to compliment its accession 
process and to reach out to some of the larger new aid donors that have not been 
a part of OECD and may have not directly expressed a desire for accession.  The 
program was “aimed at advancing the OECD’s relationship with five Key 
Partners, China, India, Brazil, Indonesia, and South Africa” (OECD 2010a) in 
particular and lays out a more specific process of preliminary positioning and 
assessment of mutual benefits in what the OECD now calls a “pre-accession 
contact phase.”    
 
Observers have noted the sensitive and potentially explosive political dynamics 
involved in these new developments, some claiming that countries such as China 
and India may be “too big and powerful” (Grocott 2012) to easily join the OECD 
without disrupting the established club’s rules and protocols dramatically. Others 
wonder if these nations might “go it alone” creating a “new aid paradigm” that 
could offer a direct challenge to the long-standing (and perhaps stale) practices of 
the Western aid apparatus, perhaps “changing the face of international 
cooperation” (OECD 2006).   More often, observers express doubt as to whether 
such nations are developed enough (Bencosme 2014, Grocott 2012) to accede to 
the OECD’s demands and standards and, with the exception of China perhaps, 
whether the relative small size of their contribution to the overall global aid pool 
can really make much of a difference at all (Chan 2010).  
 
What is important to recognize is that the list of nations becoming aid donors is 
growing (Figure 1 and Figure 2).  There are over two-dozen other countries whose 
names appear on OECD documents under the heading of “emerging donors.”  
Some of these countries, such as Malaysia, have submitted requests to be 
considered for OECD accession that have been turned down.  Most are currently 
engaging in various kinds of aid practices by contributing economic development 
assistance (either in cash, or through “aid-in-kind” disbursements) to other, less-
developed, countries.  This list includes some large contributors of foreign aid 
such as Saudi Arabia and Venezuela, but most contribute small amounts 
compared to their DAC counterparts.  Some of these donors, such as the so-called 
“Arab donors” like Kuwait, United Arab Emirates and the aforementioned Saudi 
Arabia have been giving aid since the 1960s and early 70s, always outside of 
OECD frameworks and monitoring.  Most, however, are very recent participants 
in the aid business such as Taiwan, Cyprus, Thailand, Liechtenstein, and 
Romania.  
 
The OECD recognizes the growing importance of either more carefully and 
deliberately bringing these new donors into the fold by encouraging them to 
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pursue accession and follow established OECD rules and standards of mutual 
cooperation and transparency (referred to as “harmonisation”) or by more clearly 
distinguishing and delineating between the “DAC donors” and those non-OECD 
donors who fail to adhere to DAC norms, fearing that DAC standards may be “at 
risk” if too many donors operate outside of the OECD (OECD 2004, 2006, 2010a, 
2010b; Zimmerman and Smith 2011). 
 
Furthermore, numerous countries that are defined by the OECD as “developing 
countries” are increasingly participating in foreign assistance with other 
developing nations in what the OECD and others have come to term “south-
south” cooperation.  This list includes many important donors already mentioned 
such as China, Brazil, Venezuela and India but also contains Egypt, Argentina, 
Singapore and Tunisia.  Some of this south-south cooperation involves the 
provision of professional consultants from one so-called developing country to 
another in partnership with a more traditional wealthy DAC member nation in 
what is called “triangular development cooperation” (OECD 2010a).  But the 
mere fact that developing nations are getting involved in the export of foreign 
assistance to other countries implies that the there is something to be gained by 
everyone in the aid business.   
 
In 2008, the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) released a 
report examining these developments in which it concluded that not only are 
these new forms of international cooperation significant in terms of their 
consequences for the countries in which these projects are carried out, but more 
to the point, that these “southern donors” have a very different set of principles 
and priorities that stand in stark contrast to the long standing protocols of the 
OECD.  In fact, these “southern donors are uncomfortable with reporting to the 
DAC because it is seen as a ’Northern club’, which may not always be open to 
specific South-South initiatives that do not fit into the [DAC’s] current agenda…” 
(ECOSOC 2008:9)  In other words, ECOSOC recognizes that these new southern 
donors may have a development outlook that differs from, and even challenges, 
the western aid hegemony.  ECOSOC recommends creating a “North-South 
dialogue process” in order to develop an agreed upon definition of ODA and to 
create greater “harmonization and coordination” among established (North) and 
newer (south) aid donors.   As a matter of fact, ECOSOC’s list of “donors” that 
should be invited to such a dialogue reaches much further than any list of 
emerging donors on the OECD’s radar, and includes Iran, Qatar, Libya, Algeria, 
Bahrain, Cuba, Morocco, Nigeria and Pakistan.  The report also highlights the 
growing importance of new multilateral donors such as the Arab Bank for 
Economic Development in Africa, the Islamic Development Bank, the OPEC 
Fund for International Development, the Bank of the South, and an APEC-based 
ASEAN Development Bank.  Shortly after the 2008 ECOSOC report, the OECD 
created its own “task-team” and released its own report on south-south and 
triangular cooperation efforts in 2010 (2010a). 
 
While there are some difficulties in acquiring reliable data reporting the actual 
amounts of aid currently given by emerging donors, I have created estimates 
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based on various sources (Brautigam 2009 and 2011; Cabral 2010; Callan, Blak 
and Thomas 2013; Chan 2010; The Economist 2010 and 2011; ECOSOC 2008; 
IDRC 2008, 2008a,b,c,d and e; Jayawickrama 2010; ODI 2010; OECD 2011; 
Provost 2011; Putz 2007; Walz and Ramachadran 2011; Woods 2008; 
Zimmerman and Smith 2011) to present a general picture of these new aid flows 
(Figures 3 and 4).   Since 1980, ODA from emerging donors has risen from 
approximately $2 billion dollars to approximately $18 billion, though some 
scholars estimate that the actual number may be as high as $41 billion (Walz and 
Ramachandran 2011:7).  “Put another way, non-DAC donors give somewhere 
between eight and thirty-one percent of the global gross ODA” (Walz and 
Ramachandran 2011: 6).    
 
Understanding the Emergence of New Donors 
 
Why are emerging donors stepping in?  While there have been few sociologists 
studying this issue to date, other scholars and observers of the development 
profession have begun to address this question.   In 2008, international relations 
scholar Ngaire Woods argued that this “silent revolution… in development 
assistance” was occurring largely due to the failures of the “Western aid regime” 
(Woods 2008:1205-6).   First of all, established donors are not providing enough 
aid to developing nations (and not even as much as promised).   Most OECD 
member nations fail to adhere to their own standard of 0.7% of GDP and aid 
overall is not increasing significantly (1213).  Second, Woods claims that 
structural adjustment policies were largely a failure and nations are looking for 
other sources of assistance that are free from the damaging conditionality 
imposed by DAC donors and the IMF (1216).  Third, she concludes that Western 
donors have the wrong attitude towards their role and towards their aid-recipient 
partners.  To support her claim, she cites former President of Botwana, Festus 
Mogae who said “I find that the Chinese treat us as equals.  The West treats us as 
former subjects” (1217).  Fourth, she makes a strong argument that the Western 
aid regime is too convoluted and dysfunctional.  Here she documents the layers 
and layers of policies and protocols inherent in the Bretton Woods institutions 
and the OECD as well as the “dizzying array” of organizations “creating a 
cacophony of donors” that make coordination and harmonization so difficult, 
particularly for local officials in aid-recipient countries (1218-19).   The result is 
that Western donors have failed “to deliver on better coordination and 
alignment” (1219).   A fifth reason cited by Woods is that there is really no 
incentive for emerging donors to join the Western aid regime or to attempt to 
reform it:  “They do not have enough voice or influence to make it worth their 
while to attempt to improve the running of the multilateral system” (1219).  The 
OECD and the World Bank, in particular, are slow to consider a more inclusive 
system.  The end result, she argues, is an aid architecture in crisis:   
The international development assistance regime in which established 
donors work is suffering multiple stresses… In Africa and elsewhere, 
governments needing development assistance are skeptical of promises of 
more aid, wary of conditionalities associated with aid, and fatigued by the 
heavily bureaucratic and burdensome systems used for delivering aid.  
New Donors of Development Assistance 
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Small wonder that the emerging donors are being welcomed with open 
arms. (1220) 
 
Furthermore, Woods and others have observed that many of the new donors may 
have a significant competitive advantage as aid providers to developing countries:  
they have their own successes to tout.  As newly developed or developing nations 
themselves, emerging donors can position themselves in a much more attractive 
position vis-à-vis their aid-recipient partners.  As the Botswana President’s 
statement above attests, they can emphasize a less exploitative, more egalitarian 
partnership than the established wealthy donors -- many of whom are former 
colonial or neo colonial super-powers— are able to achieve.  While we must take 
such statements with a grain of salt due to the fact that this is someone who has 
significant political motivation to make such a statement, Woods’ insight is 
nevertheless an important one in terms of how aid from new donors is perceived, 
particularly in the developing world. 
 
So how do the new emerging aid donors fit into this already-established 
transnational institution of aid? Ngaire Woods calls this a “silent revolution.”  
She says,  
“because emerging donors are not overtly attempting to overturn rules or 
replace them.  Rather, by quietly offering alternatives to aid-receiving 
countries, they are introducing competitive pressures into the existing 
system. They are weakening the bargaining position of western donors in 
respect of aid-receiving countries” (1221) 
International development and comparative politics scholar Deborah Brautigam 
arrives at very similar conclusions in her groundbreaking work on Chinese aid in 
Africa (2009).  Of central importance to Brautigam is to understand the reasons 
why China has been so successful, so quickly, in creating development 
partnerships and providing economic assistance to African nations.   First, she 
offers a scathing critique of Western aid in Africa which has been a clear failure, 
in her view (11).  Despite fifty years of traditional OECD donor efforts in Africa, 
there has been little success and African nations, she claims, are desperately 
seeking alternative models.  One of the main reasons China is investing so heavily 
in development efforts throughout Africa has been because the Western donors 
are simply not meeting the demand for aid, nor have they been able to 
demonstrate a successful model, according to Brautigam (13). 
 
In contrast, China has become a “model for prosperity” in Africa according to 
Brautigam.  Chinese developers are “very attractive to Africans as prosperous, 
confident leaders” (10).   It could very well be the case that China currently has a 
competitive advantage over Western aid agencies in offering development advice 
and in coordinating donor-recipient investment opportunities.  African leaders 
are tired of the “old model” and are very eager to try the new one. 
 
Related to this second point is the very significant observation made by 
Brautigam regarding China’s credibility in selling “anti-poverty planning” and 
implementing development efforts as a “developing country itself” (9).   In twenty 
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years, China reduced its own poverty rate from 53% (1981) to 8% (2001) and can 
point to its own development as an example of what its development programs 
can achieve.   Could it be the case that China is better able to offer anti-poverty 
programs that are more well-suited to the developing world than the wealthy 
industrialized nations are?  Brautigam believes this to be the case and claims that 
the established donors are going to have a difficult time arguing otherwise. 
 
Another observation made by Brautigam is that China is creating a new model of 
development assistance that is quite different from the traditional OECD “official 
development assistance” model.  China offers a “different kind of aid” (11) 
emphasizing infrastructure, industry and University scholarships which, 
according to her, “goes beyond ODA” to include complex “packages” of grants, 
loans, trade credits, and commercial investments (14).  If these kinds of aid 
packages become more attractive to recipient nations in the future, perhaps the 
Chinese model could lead to a radical reform of Western aid paradigms in 
accordance with the emerging Chinese approach (11).  This would be quite 
different from what the OECD nations hope for (and expect) due to the fact that 
most of their published reports declare the need to bring China into the OECD 
fold, not the other way around (e.g. OECD 2010a, Zimmerman and Smith 2011). 
 
Finally, she argues that Chinese entrepreneurship is more tied to public sector 
planning and emphasizes the important role of the state than is typical of 
Western entrepreneurial endeavors in the developing world.  Chinese 
development initiatives, therefore, are more of a “mix of market and plan” 
(Brautigam 2009:9).  China may be more capable of filling the “interstitial space” 
between economy and politics referred to earlier and may be better suited to 
“planned economic development” overall as a result. 
 
What is the reaction in the West? 
 
Brautigam makes another observation that deserves mention.   She writes that 
(Western) media reports about Chinese aid in Africa are dominated by rumors 
and speculation regarding the nature of Chinese development efforts and seem to 
indicate a widespread alarmism, fear and loathing towards the Chinese among 
those in the traditional donor societies such as the United States.  There are many 
who claim that the Chinese model represents a kind of “rogue aid” that fails to 
adhere to established world protocols and could be potentially dangerous, or at 
least highly exploitative, to the developing world (277).  Western pundits often 
point to the pure “self-interest” of the Chinese investing in oil and other basic 
extractive industries in Africa simply to fuel its own economic growth.  This 
construction of China as exploitative colonizer or parasite is not an entirely new 
one (and is certainly familiar to development scholars since at least the days of 
dependency theory) but the foe is new.  And the irony is probably lost on those 
Western pundits that they are making the same criticism of Chinese aid that 
critics of the Western aid apparatus (primarily scholars from the developing 
world) have been making for years.  In this way, it is important to note how the 
current debates regarding emerging donors such as China are perhaps laying 
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bare the realities of the donor benefits associated with aid that are central to 
international development assistance overall (Jackson 2005:17-18).  China is not 
doing anything new, but Western observers may be seeing this exploitative side of 
aid for the first time as they examine “the other.” 
 
Other reactions within the western media to the dramatic growth of Chinese 
development efforts include pleas for the West to “step up its game” in the new 
“flat world” (Friedman 2005) so that nations like the United States and Germany 
are not left behind or surpassed by the BRICs.  Others have called for the current 
club of donor nations to “open the doors” to invite new donors to engage with 
established donors, and to develop strategies of donor “enlargement.” (OECD 
2004, 2010a)  The greatest concern here often seems to be to encourage 
transparency and collect data.  It would seem that China’s tendency to keep its 
development assistance information close to the vest is of greatest concern here 
and observers of development aid are attempting to “encourage new donors to 
adopt established donor practices.” (OECD, 2010a).  Finally, some have even 
made a call to “build a new development architecture” entirely, one that 
dramatically reforms the existing models in favor of new ones built through “new 
international forums” that have yet to exist (OECD, 2010b). 
 
Where is the Macrosociological Analysis? 
 
An overview of the recent scholarly literature on new and emerging aid donors 
indicates a need for sociological theorizing and macro-level analysis.  While 
Woods and Brautigam and others have contributed greatly to our understanding 
of the new aid donors, their accounts lack clear theoretical frames that situate 
what is happening within the current debates on globalization and the role of aid 
within the global political economy.  What we know about emerging donors up to 
now is predominately based upon the work of journalists, economists, business 
economists, international relations scholars, public policy scholars, and, of 
course, development agency practitioners themselves.  Therefore, this paper will 
conclude by highlighting a few points of analysis based upon the recent 
theoretical and empirical work done by sociologists with regard to aid and its role 
in the global economy.  We will now return to the theoretical discussion from the 
start of the paper to address the questions:  What is going on here, why are 
emerging donors entering the aid business?  And what is the future of the OECD 
apparatus? 
  
With regard to the first question, drawing upon world-systems theory and world 
polity theory, it seems clear that the transnational institution of aid exists 
because growing economies need greater global economic integration to continue 
their growth.  Growing economies need raw materials, labor, new markets and 
investment opportunities and developing countries can provide all of these.  The 
economic politics of aid are a mechanism that creates the conditions in which 
donor countries can foster access to all of these things.  Western aid donors such 
as Japan, Germany, France and the United States utilized development assistance 
to build their global economic hegemony during the post-war years.  Rapidly 
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growing economies such as Hungary, Greece, Turkey, Korea, India, Brazil, Russia 
and China want in on the same opportunities and benefits that playing the aid 
game provides.  “Official development assistance” creates international ties 
between donor and recipient nations and fosters transnational business 
partnerships, largely to the benefit of the donor nation.  Aid, in this sense, is a 
donor-nation “investment” in its own global economic aspirations.  While aid is 
hidden behind the shiny veneer of beneficence of “rich helping poor” it is, in fact, 
a donor-nation practice designed to serve as a subsidy for donor-nation-based 
enterprises.  United States provision of millions of dollars of ODA to Honduras to 
help build a new hydroelectric dam under the auspices of “developing the 
Honduran energy sector” return to U.S. enterprises in the form of “aid-tied” 
contracts to U.S. dam building companies.  A German contribution of $14 million 
of mixed ODA and credit to Honduras returns to the German firm ABG 
Telefunken to purchase four generators and equipment worth almost exactly the 
same amount. (Jackson 2005:166)  New donors like China are simply doing the 
same thing that the old donors have been doing for over fifty years:  use public 
monies collected by national governments and given to recipient nations in the 
form of ODA to promote the economic (and geopolitical) interests of those 
national governments.  Aid is the catalyst of globalization in the developing world 
and fosters transnational economic cooperation to the benefit of powerful 
enterprises largely based in the donor nations.  Aid-recipient nations do receive 
some benefit from these transnational arrangements, but the larger benefits 
accrue to the donor countries (Jackson 2005). 
 
Secondly, in line with world polity theory, new donors are building cultural 
capital within the world polity arena.  Giving aid becomes part of the “cultural 
toolkit” (Swidler 1986) for these new donors as they seek to gain political benefits 
by distinguishing themselves as part of the donors club and by emulating the aid 
practices of the historically wealthier nations, consistent with the world-polity 
concept of “isomorphism” (Scott and Meyer 1994). 
 
Furthermore, aid fosters transnational connections and networks between real 
human beings working within large bureaucratic organizations, both private and 
public.  ODA plays an important role, therefore, in building transnational 
organizational linkages that set the stage for these economic politics to emerge in 
the first place.  As world polity theorists have maintained, the rules for the global 
economy are based in common understandings, policies, frameworks and recipes 
known as “world cultural scripts” (Meyer et. al. 1997).   These include legal 
frameworks, international weights and measures standards, and other 
international conventions and treaties that together lay the bureaucratic 
underpinnings of global economic trades and transactions.  Often conceived of as 
part of the “role of the state” within development scholarship, these 
organizational norms and protocols allow for the efficient interface of firms, 
enterprises and government agencies at the transnational level and are 
inextricably linked to global economic phenomenon.  Aid occupies the interstitial 
space between “the market” and “the state” which can be better understood as an 
example of how global capitalism is embedded in modern bureaucratic structures 
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(Sjoberg 1999).    Within these structures of “bureaucratic capitalism,” higher 
education and “expertise” both play an extremely important role as the managers 
and planners of complex transnational projects must employ state-of-the-art 
technologies, professional experts in myriad fields, and global communications 
networks in order to effectively carry out their goals.  Aid can serve (and often 
does serve) as a “global expert brokerage service” which is utilized by both 
recipient (where the experts are in demand) and donor (where the experts are 
looking for work) nations.   When China uses aid to grant university scholarships 
to would-be African engineers for them to study at Chinese universities, they are 
not only fostering the development goal of “training experts” for aid recipient 
nations in Africa, but they are also fostering the long term health of the institutes 
of higher education in China and building constructive relationships with future 
leaders of the countries receiving these scholarships.  It would appear that China 
may even understand this reality better than the traditional OECD donors 
because, according to some observers, Chinese aid packages place more emphasis 
on these kinds of university training programs (Brautigam 2009:158).   
 
In terms of the second question regarding the future of the Western aid regime, 
there are a number of facets to consider.  First, do the new donors represent an 
“alternative” to the Western aid regime (i.e.  Is this South-South aid as opposed 
to North-South)?  Or, in the framework of field theory, do new donors such as 
China create the conditions where the development "field" becomes "unsettled" 
as is the case "if the relative power of actors is equalized, then there is a 
possibility for a good deal of jockeying for advantage... and the very existence and 
structure of [the field] is up for grabs" (Fligstein and McAdam, 2012:12) 
 
 Based on the evidence to this point, it appears that that is not the case.   New 
donors are largely participating in the same transnational institution as 
established donors and, with few exceptions, are largely conforming to Western 
(OECD) frameworks and protocols.  This is the case for the large majority of new 
donors.  As for the exceptions, there are some donors (such as Venezuela and 
China, for example) that position themselves as what field theory calls 
"challengers" that "occupy less privilged niches with the field and ordinarily wield 
little influence over its operation" that remains under the disproportionate 
influence of the "incumbents" -- the traditional Western aid providers "who wield 
disproportionate influence... and whose interests and views tend to be heavily 
reflected in the... field." (Fligstein and McAdam, 2012: 13)  When one examines 
the new donor activities sociologically, it becomes clear that they are 
participating in the transnational institution of aid in an almost identical fashion 
to the established aid donors:  seeking economic benefits for themselves by 
providing aid to less-advantaged nations (i.e. North to South, not South to 
South).  It could be argued further that the so-called “South-South” form of aid 
that they claim to administer may simply be their own version of the shiny veneer 
of beneficence… a nice-sounding public relations message that gives them claim 
to legitimacy and moral authority to intervene and participate in the affairs of 
another sovereign nation.    
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Part of the analytical problem here may be with the terms “global north” and 
“global south” in the first place.   “South-south” aid implies the notion of the poor 
helping the poor, but we may need to rethink the concepts of global south and 
global north within sociology (Jackson et al. 2016).  Historically these terms have 
emerged as alternatives or euphemisms for long-established dichotomous 
concepts such as “developed vs. developing” or “core vs. periphery.”  However, as 
Judy Aulette has stated: 
Although the terms Global North and South are widely used—
perhaps they are even the dominant terms used by Southern 
scholars—they have not yet been theorized extensively.… North and 
South, on the one hand, quickly capture a critical cleavage within 
the global political economy, but they do not tell us about the gaps 
within the North and South by social class and among various 
nations within each category.  Many people in the North are poor 
and oppressed, and every nation in the South includes those who 
are wealthy and powerful. (Aulette 2012:1548) 
 
Sociological scholarship has begun to eschew such dualism by calling us to 
examine global political economy using more granular, and multiscalar 
epistemologies.  “Global south” can be thought of outside of nation-state 
categories, for example.  And various scholars have encouraged us to explore the 
world economy in ways that move us beyond “nation state centrism” (Robinson 
2004:88) and allow us to consider “other containers of development” (Brewer 
2011:312) at both the transnational (regional or global) as well as subnational 
(states, counties, and districts) levels.  Re-defining the “global south” in this way 
we can see it as a  
“a conceptual framework used to observe the contingent and 
interconnected pockets of poverty, gender inequality, and racism 
throughout the world, including the so-called “wealthy nations,” one that 
attends to the importance of local context and privileges the perspectives 
of the subordinate and subaltern in the production of knowledge” (Jackson 
et al. 2012). 
 
 
Examining the aid provided by new donors such as China from this perspective 
brings into sharper focus the reality of Chinese aid as being far removed from 
“poor helping poor.”  For example, a list of recent Chinese aid efforts in Central 
America reveals two substantial canal/cross-country rail projects in Nicaragua 
($40 billion) and Honduras ($20 billion) being carried out by Chinese 
construction firms HKND Group and China Harbor Engineering Co. respectively; 
a $300 million dollar telecommunication satellite project in Nicaragua carried 
out by the Great Wall Corp.; and a $295 million dollar hydroelectric dam effort in 
Honduras conducted by Chinese dam construction giant ICBC.  Current Chinese 
aid efforts in Uganda include a proposed $2 billion dollar hydroelectric dam 
project on the Nile river and a $580 million dollar, 30-mile, four-lane expressway 
connecting the capital city of Kampala to the Entebbe International Airport that 
was funded in part by a $350 million loan from the Export Import Bank of China 
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(Chexim) and built by a Chinese contractor, China Communications Construction 
Co. Ltd (Biryabarema 2018).  These aid activities much more closely resemble the 
established practices of the “global north” than they do “poor helping poor” as 
wealthy interests in China pursue the interests of wealthy companies and their 
investors in China by working in conjunction with local elites in Central 
American and African countries.  These local elites are actually pockets of the 
“global north” in the developing world or what Robinson calls the “transnational 
fraction of the local bourgeoisie” (2004) working to pursue mutually beneficial 
global economic transactions.  This is why “South-South aid” is often a 
misnomer.  It would be more accurate to say that China (and India, and Brazil 
and others) are participating in the “global north” institution of aid.  Their 
government officials, entrepreneurs and other elite groups are organizing 
transnationally and engaging in the global north practice of development 
assistance in a way that fosters their own geo-political and economic interests.  
New donors are simply subsidizing their own globalizing industries and pursuing 
opportunities for their own rapidly growing economies, just like the so-called 
“Northern” countries have been doing for decades. 
 
That said, will development aid as an institution become more sensitive to the 
needs of the poor because it is being increasingly administered by nations that 
have higher levels of poverty themselves?  This is an open empirical question and 
while some observers have noted some differences in the practice of new donors, 
more research will need to be conducted on this matter before we can arrive at a 
clear answer. 
 
Do new donors offer more suitable development strategies with fewer strings 
attached?  Are they more attuned to local needs and more sensitive to local 
sovereignty?  Again, while some observers claim this to be the case, it is much too 
early in the history of these emerging donor practices to be able to say for certain.  
This is another open empirical question that future researchers should examine 
closely by studying the activities of new donors in developing contexts 
throughout the world. 
 
And what about the fears of Western media pundits who ask whether new donors 
will eventually supplant the Western aid regime?   This is clearly an open 
question as well.  By way of conclusion, I would like to offer several final 
observations regarding “the future of aid” in these regards. 
 
The Future of the OECD Aid Apparatus 
 
First, it is important to recognize that most new donors are easily assimilating 
into the established institution of aid and the OECD.  Some, such as Russia, have 
been left out of this system for a long time and others, such as Korea, are quite 
new.  All appear to be quite eager to join the “donors’ club” and enjoy the benefits 
that such membership provides.  In the foreseeable future, we can therefore very 
reasonably expect further “enlargement” of the transnational institution of aid 
with a greater number of donor countries participating in established aid 
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practices and a larger array of donors becoming active in aid-recipient nations.  
For the first forty years, the Western aid regime was made up of about twenty 
donors  (approximately ten percent of the world’s nations).  Currently, about one-
third of the worlds’ nations are “donor nations” in some form or another.  This 
enlargement of the aid apparatus will grow further in the next fifty years, but 
most of these new donors will likely conform to the established programmes and 
standards of the OECD, even as they may achieve some small level of reform of 
those standards and protocols.  Some have called for new international forums 
that may enable such reforms to come about more readily (Walz and 
Ramachandran 2011:24) but it remains to be seen whether such initiatives are in 
the interest of the most powerful donor nations and if they would agree to 
participate in re-writing the established rules of the club. 
 
Therefore, second, new donors may mark the beginning of the end of Western aid 
hegemony, but not the end of the Western aid apparatus.  We might be able to 
imagine a world where China and India, for example, are the largest aid donors in 
fifty years, surpassing the aid contributions of Germany and even the United 
States.  But this does not mean that Western aid will die out, it will simply mean 
that Western aid will become a more diverse and broadly inclusive transnational 
institution.  As greater numbers of donors participate in the institution, we may 
expect that the policies created and maintained by the OECD, for example, will 
become more entrenched as international standards for aid become universal 
and banal.  Based on the scholarship to date, it is not likely that we will see major 
reforms in these protocols unless some unforeseen conflict or disaster were to 
occur within the world of development.  Nevertheless, these policies could face 
significant reform and may change if the power politics of those driving the 
institution should change. 
 
Third, there are some emerging donors (China, Venezuela, and even Iran, for 
example) that represent a new challenge to the institution of aid itself.  China at 
one time considered joining the OECD but now appears to prefer to operate 
autonomously.  While there are many similarities to established aid practices, 
these “alternative donors” may mean increasing competition within the aid 
regime and Western donors may be faced, for the first time in their history, with a 
challenge to their official development assistance monopoly.  This may represent 
what field theory calls a new "episode of contention" which is "a period of 
emergent, sustained contentious interaction between actors utilizing new and 
innovative forms of action vis-a-vis one another" (Fligstein and McAdam, 
2012:21).  If the new alternative aid model (or models) find success in the 
developing world among aid-recipient nations, we may see the incumbents make 
appeals to "the status quo in an effort to try to stabilize the situation" (22).  This 
is already observable in many of the current OECD efforts.  We may also see 
attempts at reform and even “borrowing” by the OECD and established aid 
donors (isomorphism and diffusion working in new directions) as "perceived 
threats and opportunities generally change the consciousness of field actors." 
(22)  This typically leads to the incumbents' attempt to "reconstite the old order" 
which seems like a more likely outcome than a growing rift or great conflict 
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between the new and old donors.  Yet Fligstein and McAdam also state that in 
"rare instances... oppositional logics may carry the day as challengers successfully 
sustain mobilization and slowly being to institutionalize new practices and rules."    
Whether the status quo is reasserted within the aid apparatus or whether the 
"field begins to gravitate toward a new settlement of rules and norms" (22) is 
really too soon to say.  
 
One thing is certain in this regard that is relevant for development scholars:  the 
lack of reliable data on these new donors who do not always disclose their aid 
practices in a transparent manner.  In addition, we should caution against 
framing these new alternative donors as “south-south” aid.  If these new donor 
practices are examined closely it is clear that these aid practices, while politically 
provocative to the Western powers, are, in fact “elite-to-elite” economic politics 
and not “poor to poor” counterhegemonic practices. 
 
Fourth, it is very interesting that the increased interest in the new donors of 
foreign assistance have laid bare the aid apparatus for what it is and have 
"expos[e] rules that had been taken for granted, calling into question the 
perceived benefits of those rules" (Fligstein and McAdam 2012: 22)  It is an 
economic politics designed to benefit donors.  More donors want in on the game 
and while Western journalists may wring their hands at the “predations” of the 
Chinese aid business, for example, they are really only seeing the realities of aid 
overall--including the practices of Western donors-- for the first time. 
 
Fifth, and most importantly, the transnational institution of aid will continue to 
play a primary role in shaping global political and economic integration.  Rather 
than development assistance waning in the next fifty years (as many have 
predicted, erroneously in my view), aid could be of increasing global importance 
as more donors enter the "strategic action field" and recipient nations face 
greater complexity in negotiating the new terrain.   
 
Therefore, emerging donors are a significant research opportunity for 
development sociologists.  We do not have enough research, enough data, nor 
enough understanding of what the new donors are doing.4  Yet there are 
numerous “new” agencies and coalitions of agencies that are worthy of study and 
sociological analysis:  The UN’s Group of 77, The UN Special Unit for South-
South Cooperation (which includes the High Level Committee on South-South 
Cooperation, the Global South-South Development Academy, the Global South-
South Development Expo, the South-South Global Assets and Technology 
Exchange), and the OECD’s Task Team on South-South Cooperation, just to 
name a few.  Furthermore, sociologists should explore the list of over forty new 
donor nations, each with their own bilateral aid agencies, foreign assistance 
priorities and unique historical relationships to the developing world.  Studying 
each of these new donors and trying to identify the complex networks that form 
as a result of the increasing transnational economic and political arrangements 
 
4 Deborah Brautigam’s website lists nine research ideas on Chinese aid alone. 
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that are being created each year provides us with much work to do and many 
opportunities to be taken.    
 
What may the distant future hold?  Given the trend of an increasing number of 
nations joining the OECD and/or contributing development assistance, it is 
possible that in the next fifty years the number of countries in the world giving 
aid may actually surpass the number receiving aid.  The number on the list now is 
approaching sixty or seventy nations with donor activities.  We may arrive soon 
at an “aid donor tipping point” of one hundred or more (over half the world’s 
nations). The corollary to this growing world “donor space” is, of course, a 
shrinking world “recipient space.”  The “North” becomes larger than the “South” 
for the first time in human history.  A future in which there are more donors than 
recipients, in turn, could create greater competition among donors over the 
shrinking global space in need of aid.  This would result in a “race to the bottom” 
of an entirely different variety than what is typically discussed!  Donors of 
development assistance could be subsequently overwhelming the spaces “in need 
of development” with greater and greater attention and resources.  For the more 
optimistic among us, such an “aid donor tipping point” could begin the final 
sustained and accelerated effort to eradicate global spaces of poverty throughout 
the world – including, maybe, those remaining “pockets of poverty” in the “global 
north” (lest we forget the development needs in places like the Mississippi delta 
and inner-city Detroit).   For the more pessimistic (and perhaps ecologically-
minded) among us, however, such a process could certainly mean “the near 
culmination of the centuries-long process of capitalism’s extensive enlargement” 
(Robinson 2004: 7) and an acceleration of the Faustian tragedy in which 
“development authorities everywhere have accumulated powers that are 
enormous, uncontrolled and all too often lethal” (Berman 1982: 75). 
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FIGURES 
 
Figure 1:  Established and “Emerging” donors 
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Figure 2:  Aid Donors, 1960-2010 
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Figure 3:  Global Development Assistance 
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Figure 4:  New and Emerging Donors, 1980-2010 
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